State of Utah v. Jamis M. Johnson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
State of Utah v. Jamis M. Johnson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney G. Snow; Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson; Counsel for Appellant.
Karen A. Klucznik; Mark W. Baer; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney
General; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Johnson, No. 20070909 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/562
CaseNo.20070909-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Jamis M. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for one count of securities fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000), in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Millard County, the Honorable Donald 
J. Eyre presiding. 
RODNEY G. SNOW 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Counsel for Appellant 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
MARK W. BAIJR 
Assistants Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (8f)l) 366-0180 
Counsel for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 0 3 2009 
CaseNo.20070909-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Jamis M. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from a conviction for one count of securities fraud, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000), in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Millard County, the Honorable Donald 
J. Eyre presiding. 
RODNEY G. SNOW 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Counsel for Appellant 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK (7912) 
MARKW. BAER 
Assistants Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 10 
I. WHERE THE VICTIMS CONVEYED THEIR DAIRY FARM AND 
EQUIPMENT TO AN OUTSIDE CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE 
FOR STOCK IN THE CORPORATION, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY RULED THAT THE TRANSFER CONSTITUTED A SALE 
OF SECURITIES UNDER UTAH LAW 10 
A. Rules of statutory construction 11 
B. Relevant statutes 12 
C. The circumstances surrounding the August 9th transaction do not 
support defendant's claim that the transaction did not constitute a 
disposition of securities for value 13 
D. The securities fraud statute does not support defendant's claim that 
the August 9th transaction did not constitute a disposition of 
securities for value 20 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN LETTING 
THE STATE'S EXPERT OPINE ON THE GENERAL REACH OF 
UTAH'S SECURITIES LAWS AND THE DISCLOSURES NECESSARY 
THEREUNDER, WHERE THE STATE'S EXPERT NEVER OFFERED 
AN OPINION ON DEFENDANT'S GUILT 21 
A. Governing law 22 
B. Proceedings below 25 
i 
C. Expert testimony that does not specifically comment on the facts of 
the case but only addresses what types of transactions are generally 
covered by securities laws and what general requirements those 
laws impose does not constitute impermissible testimony 32 
1. Inadmissible legal conclusions 32 
2. Incorrect legal conclusions 34 
a. General disclosures required under section 61-1-1(2) 34 
b. Specific disclosures required of "controlled persons/' 36 
D. Defendant's challenge to Hines's testimony also fails because he 
was not prejudiced by that testimony 38 
DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
CLAIMS FAIL, WHERE THEY REST ON AN INACCURATE 
PORTRAYAL OF THE STATE'S LEGAL ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY 
AND WHERE THE TRIAL COURT, IN ANY CASE, PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LAW 41 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS RENEWED 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF 
APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 44 
A. Applicable law 45 
B. Proceedings below 46 
C Because defendant's claim goes only to record evidence raised in 
his Renewed Motion for New Trial and because defendant did not 
file a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of that 
motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim 47 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH DEFENDANT'S 
RESTITUTION CLAIM WHERE DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF 
APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER 49 
ii 
A Ciin'iTniii"' 1<I \v 
Proceedings below 
ADDENDA 
Addenj^r. 
.52 
. . : U I V_ I M v / M i l l . ;, • • I . - I • _ • .- , 
Utah Code Ann. § 61 ! -1 .* < 2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61 1-2! (2000) 
Utah R. \p\\ 
l i ah R. Cn:r>. i\ 24 
UtahR. Evid. "'.»: 
L'^hR.r .ut* "• '• 
Addendum B: State's Exhibit 1 
in 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Securities and Exclwnge Common v. Mercliant Capital, LLC, 
483 F.3d 747 (11th Cir. 2007) 36,37 
Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 
250 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2001) 37 
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) 23, 33 
United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2005) 23,33 
STATE CASES 
Caldwell v. State, 95 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) 12 
Capital General Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg., 
777 P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1989) 12,15,16,17 
City of St. George v. Smith, 814 P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1991) 52, 53 
In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54,165 P.3d 1206 11 
Patey v. Lainlmrt, 1999 UT 31, 977 P.2d 1193 23,33 
Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15 (Utah 1983) 11 
People v. Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d 60 (App. Div. 1998) 25, 38,40 
People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003) 25, 33,38 
Premier Van Sclmack Realty, Inc. v. Seig, 2002 UT App 173, 51 P.3d 24 15,18,19 
ProMax Development Corp. v. Rattle, 2000 UT4, 998 P.2d 254 50 
Reisbeck v. HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, 2 P.3d 447 45,49, 53 
S&FSupply Co. v. Hunter, 527P.2d217(Utah 1974) 44 
Salt Lake City v. Guffey, 2001 UT App 17U 51 
State v. Abbot, 2000 UT App 342U 51 
iv 
State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) 42 
State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) 12 
State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355,36 P.3d 533 11 
State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13,155 P.3d 909 22, 24 
State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 11 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 53 
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6,106 P.3d 729 50, 51 
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 63 P.3d 72 40 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980) 53 
State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1994) 24 
State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, 975 P.2d 489 1 
State v. LaCount, 732 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007), 
affd, 750 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008), cert, denied, 129 S. Ct. 631 (2008) 25,33 
State v. Larsen (Larsen II), 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) passim 
State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998) 41,42 
State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah 1996) 49 
State v. R.C., 2005 UT App 105U 53 
State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89,174 P.3d 628 2 
State v. Stringlum, 957 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1998) 2,22 
State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah App. 1996) 24 
State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 314, 78 P.3d 627 1 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518 (Utah 1997) 11 
v 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13 (2000) 20, 21, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2008) 1 
STATE RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 702 3,22 
Utah R. Evid. 704(a) 22 
VI 
CaseNo.20070909-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Jamis M. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for securities fraud, a second degree felony. 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where the victims conveyed their dairy farm and its equipment to an outside 
corporation in exchange for stock in the corporation, did the trial court properly mle that the 
transaction constituted a disposition of securities for value under Utah law? 
Standard of Review. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed 
for correctness. See State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 314, \ 7, 78 P.3d 627. Similarly, a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to dismiss presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54,\ 10, 975 P.2d 489. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in letting the State's expert opine on the 
general reach of Utah's securities laws and the disclosures necessaiy thereunder, where the 
State's expert never offered an opinion on defendant's guilt? 
Standard of Review. Rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion. See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1998). 
3. Do defendant's due process and separation of powers claims fail where they rest 
on an inaccurate portrayal of the State's legal arguments to the jury and, in any case, the trial 
court properly instructed the jury on the law?1 
Standard of Review. Whether a statute is constitutional as applied raises a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, Tf 17, 174 P.3d 628. 
4. Does this Court have jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
order denying his Renewed Motion for New Trial, where defendant's notice of appeal did 
not perfect an appeal from that order? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
5. Does this Court have jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
restitution order, where defendant's notice of appeal did not perfect an appeal from that 
order? 
1
 The Issues and Standard of Review section of defendant's brief includes a claim, 
raised as Issue 3, challenging the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed jury 
instruction concerning expert testimony. See Aplt. Br. at 3. However, the Argument section 
of defendant's brief does not address this issue as a separate claim but, rather, merely 
addresses it in passing in his Issue 2. Thus, the State renumbers defendant's issues 4, 5, and 
6 as issues 3, 4, and 5. 
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Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and court rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, 61-1-13, 61-1-21 (2000); 
Utah R. App. P. 4; Utah R. Crim. P. 24; Utah R. Evid. 702, 704. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and co-defendant Paul Schwenke were charged with one count of securities 
fraud and one count of theft by deception (R.63-65). After a preliminary hearing, defendant 
was bound over as charged (R.77-79). The trial court granted defendant's motion to sever 
his and his co-defendant's cases (R.122-29,1030, 429). 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover (R. 131-58). After a hearing, the trial court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss the theft charge, but denied defendant's motion to 
quash the securities fraud charge (R.541-44). Defendant's motions to dismiss and for partial 
summary judgment were also denied (R.843-44,895-96,1199-2000,1201-03,1321-22). 
At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the case at the close of the State's case-in-chief 
(R. 1999:268). The court denied the motion (R. 1999:290). The jury convicted defendant as 
charged (R.1451). Defendant's motion to arrest judgment was denied (R.1506-08,1612-14). 
On June 6,2007, defendant was sentenced to a suspended term of one-to-fifteen years 
in prison, one year in jail, and 36 months probation (R. 1677-80). He was also ordered to pay 
restitution, jointly and severally with his original co-defendant, of $125,000 (Id.). 
On June 15, 2007, defendant objected to the restitution order and requested a 
restitution hearing (R. 1619-20). Defendant then moved for a new trial (R. 1621-23). On 
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July 2,2007, the trial court entered its final Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment (R. 1677-
80). On October 10, 2007, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's Motion for 
New Trial (R. 1964-79). On October 10 and 24,2007, the trial court held restitution hearings 
(R.1980-82,1995-96). On November 8, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R.2000-
02). On November 14,2007, defendant filed a Renewed Motion for New Trial (R.2003-05). 
On December 5, 2007, the trial court reduced restitution to $120,000 (R.2032-42). On 
February 11, 2008, the court denied defendant's second motion for new trial (R.2074). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ron Myers started moving his family dairy farm from Oregon to Millard County, 
Utah around 1981. In 2000, Myers held the farm in a limited liability corporation, Dairy-
King Farm, with his son-in-law Jim Young and Young's brother. Young was the primary 
manager of the farm, which had about 150 cows. "[T]he dairy industry wras tough" around 
2000, and the farm "was struggling." The farm had just obtained a "good sized loan," and 
"we were looking for some [financial help] at that point" (R. 1999:121,125,213-15). 
In July 2000, a cattle seller, Duane Benton, told Young about "a guy," Paul 
Schwenke, "who was interested in meeting some dairy farmers to talk about some 
investment" (R. 1999:124). Young met with Schwenke in Fillmore in late July. Schwenke 
introduced defendant, who was also at the meeting, as "the stock expert" (R. 1999:125-
27,301-03). 
2
 Paul Schwenke identified the cattle seller as Duane Bitman (R. 1999:302). 
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At the meeting, Schwenke "presented his plan, what, what he had in mind for, for 
financing." Schwenke wanted to finance the farm's property and explained that he "had a 
company called Americandairy.com." Schwenke "wanted to ge t . . . like 10-15,000 cows" 
and "basically... open a public company[;] he wanted to sell stocks in Americandairy.com 
and . . . that was where he was . . . going to get public financing" (R. 1999:127). Schwenke 
told Young "he had about $10,000,000 worth of assets" to put into the venture, as well as 
doctors and lawyers and "other investors" who wanted to invest in the corporation 
(R. 1999:132-33,155,165). Schwenke said "there was another dairy involved inHolden and 
he had hoped to get more" (R. 1999:134). Schwenke then "had [defendant] explain a little bit 
about stocks, how they work and how this was going to, how this idea was going to work" 
(R.1999:128). 
Following defendant's explanation, the meeting turned to the farm's financial 
situation. Schwenke "wanted to know how many cows we had" and "what kind of loans and 
stuff we had on the farm." Young told the group that "we weren't in real bad shape but we 
needed to get bigger." He explained, "[i]t's difficult to run a small dairy operation and we 
needed, we had enough facilities for 600 cows and we needed to fill them up to make the 
operation more efficient" (R.1999:130). 
The next day, Young discussed Schwenke's plan with his father-in-law, Myers. 
Young and Myers decided to accept Schwenke's offer, and agreed to meet with him at a 
building in Salt Lake City, where defendant had his office (R.1999:134-36,307). 
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Both Young and Myers attended this second meeting in early August 2000 (R. 
1999:138,163,215). They first met Schwenke and then proceeded to defendant's office (R. 
1999:215-16). Defendant was again introduced, this time to Myers, as "a high-powered 
lawyer" and "a security expert" from New York who "basically put together . . . stock 
companies or securities companies" (R. 1999:217). The parties "talked about trading [] the 
farm for shares in Americandairy.com" (R. 1999:13 7). And Myers explained that they had "a 
substantial loan against the dairy with.. . Central Bank" and "there was no way" to complete 
the transaction "without the refinance of Central Bank" (R. 1999:239-40). 
Then, Myers, who "didn't understand stock at all," asked defendant to explain "how 
the process [of a company going public] works" (R. 1999:218,309). Defendant told Myers 
that, "basically... you put together the, basically the, the stock company and then at some 
point you have.. . a public offering." According to defendant, "they could start this stock at 
approximately $8 . . . , but at minimum they could start it at about $4 a share" (R. 1999:218, 
231). When Myers asked whether he "could be involved in that public offering," defendant 
"said it would be highly unusual but it could happen" (R. 1999:219). 
Defendant then presented Young and Myers with a stock purchase agreement (R. 
1999:137,220). Young and Myers stated "[tjhere was some things we wanted changed"; in 
particular, they "wanted to have the ability to get the dairy back at some point if this thing 
didn't work out" (R. 1999:220-21). After adding a provision allowing them to regain the 
farm if the corporation did not have a public offering within two years, Young and Myers 
met with defendant and Schwenke again on August 9, 2000 (R.1999:140,163,306). 
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At that meeting, defendant and Schwenke presented the revised stock purchase 
agreement, a warranty deed, and a proxy agreement for signatures (R. 1999:222,312-13; St. 
Exh. 1,5). "[Tjrying to get financing for our farm," Young and Myers signed the agreement 
and transferred the farm's assets to Americandairy.com (R. 1999:138-40,142,144-45,233). 
In addition to the real estate of the farm, Young and Myers transferred the farm 
equipment, which conservatively had a replacement value of approximately $130,000 (R. 
1999:150-51,236-38). Again, Myers knew "there was no way that we could perform [the 
transaction] without the refinance of Central Bank And that's the reason we signed the 
warranty deed. The warranty deed was supposed to have been used only to refinance the 
dairy and satisfy Central Bank period" (R. 1999:239-40). Moreover, Young and Myers 
expected to get "financing, cattle, money for cattle" out of the deal. However, they never 
received any actual financing (R. 1999:152). 
Young signed the Stock Purchase Trade Agreement and deed on behalf of Dairy-King 
Farms. Defendant executed the Agreement as CEO of Americandairy.com. Then, as 
president of Americandairy.com, defendant executed one stock certificate transferring 
150,000 shares to Myers and another certificate transferring 50,000 shares to Young 
(R.1999:141-42,144,223-26,234; St. Exh. 1-3). At the time, no one else held shares in the 
corporation (R. 1999:314). Schwenke then had Young sign a proxy to let Schwenke "run the 
business ofAmericandairy.com without a meeting of the board" (R.1999:227-28). 
Before Young and Myers signed the documents, neither defendant nor Schwenke 
presented any additional "historical business information" about Americandairy.com or 
7 
information about "the current or past financial situation" of the corporation (R.1999:225, 
230). Nor did they provide a complete list of the principals in the corporation, or any 
information concerning the principals' financial background and history (R. 1999:155,225). 
In addition, although defendant and Schwenke told Young and Myers there were "risks in 
any stock transaction," they never enumerated those risks (R. 1999:145-46,230). Nor did 
they offer any additional information concerning either the $10 million Schwenke 
supposedly could contribute to the enterprise or the "possible market for the stock" 
(R. 1999:155,230). And defendant never told Myers or Young that, during the period in 
which this transaction was presented and then executed, he "was subject to disciplinary 
proceedings before the Utah State Bar alleging misappropriation of client funds from an 
event which occurred in October of 1992," had three federal tax liens against his property for 
over $1,645,500.00, and had a Small Business Administration judgment against him 
(R.1999:244,266-67;St.Exh.7-9,12). 
According to Young, he and Myers probably would have entered into the transaction 
with Schwenke even if defendant had not been involved. Still, defendant's position as an 
attorney with a specialty in securities law "lent a great deal of credibility" to how he and 
Schwenke presented it (R.1999:154,192). 
Myers and Young never received any financing out of the August 9th transaction 
(R. 1999:152,178,231). And, having transferred their deed to Americandairy.com, they 
"were no longer able to go to a bank to get financing" (R. 1999:173). Within months of the 
transaction, Myers and Young lost their farm and farm equipment (R.1999:178,237). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his various motions to 
dismiss because Myers' and Young's transfer of their farm to Americandairy.com for stock 
constituted merely a change in their form of ownership of their farm, not a sale of securities 
as required under the securities fraud statute. Defendant's claim fails because nothing in his 
or Schwenke's description of the August 9th transaction suggested that Myers and Young 
were merely changing their form of ownership of the farm. Moreover, even if the transaction 
did constitute merely a change in their form of ownership, the securities statutes explicitly 
define such transactions as sales of securities. 
Point II. Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in letting the State's 
security expert opine concerning the purposes of Utah's securities laws and the disclosures 
necessary thereunder. Defendant's assertion that the expert gave impermissible legal 
conclusions is not supported by case law, where the expert never gave any legal opinion 
concerning whether defendant's conduct violated the law. In addition, defendant's 
contention that the expert misrepresented the law is not supported by the record. Finally, 
even if the expert did exceed permissible limits on expert testimony, defendant has not 
shown that he was prejudiced by that testimony where it was consistent with the law and the 
trial court properly instructed the jury both on the law and on the weight jurors should give 
expert testimony. 
Point III. Defendant claims that the securities fraud statute, as applied in this case, 
was both unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of 
9 
powers clause. Both of defendant's constitutional claims, however, rest on his allegation that 
the State misrepresented the law at trial. Thus, to prove his claims, defendant must show 
both that the State misrepresented the law at trial and that the trial court, by failing to correct 
those misrepresentations in its jury instructions, adopted the State's misrepresentations. 
Defendant has made neither showing here. Thus, his claim fails. 
Point VI. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying the newly discovered 
evidence claim raised in his two motions for new trial. Because defendant did not present 
the newly discovered evidence in his first motion, his claim on appeal must go only to his 
second motion. But defendant never filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court order 
denying his second motion. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim. 
Point V. Defendant challenges the trial court's post-judgment restitution order. 
However, defendant never filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's restitution 
order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHERE THE VICTIMS CONVEYED THEIR DAIRY FARM AND 
EQUIPMENT TO AN OUTSIDE CORPORATION IN EXCHANGE 
FOR STOCK IN THE CORPORATION, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY RULED THAT THE TRANSFER CONSTITUTED A 
SALE OF SECURITIES UNDER UTAH LAW 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the 
securities fraud charge under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000). See Aplt. Br. at 25-28. In 
doing so, defendant acknowledges that Myers and Young transferred their Dairy-King Farms 
to Americandairy.com in exchange for stock on August 9th. See id. at 26. Defendant 
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claims, however, that because Myers and Young were the sole shareholders in 
Americandairy.com after the transfer, their "conversion from LLC to American Dairy was 
not a disposition for value [as required under section 61-1-1], but rather was [merely] a 
change in the form of ownership." Id. at 27. Thus, defendant argues, the trial court should 
have granted his motions to dismiss. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A. Rules of statutory construction. 
"'When interpreting statutes," this Court's "primary goal is to evince the true intent 
and purpose of the Legislature,'" and "the best evidence of legislative intent" is "'the plain 
language of the statute itself.'" In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, \ 6, 165 P.3d 1206 (citation 
omitted). Thus, this Court "assume[s] that each term in the statute was used advisedly." 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
Moreover, statutory terms are "interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the 
statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^  9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations omitted). 
With these rules as a backdrop, "[t]he primary purpose of the securities laws is to 
protect those who purchase securities," especially "'the inexperienced, confiding, and 
credulous investor.'" State v. Dumke, 901 S.W.2d 100,102-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citation 
omitted). "[Securities laws[, therefore] are remedial in nature and should be broadly and 
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose." Payable Accounting Corp. v. 
McKinley, 667 P.2d 15, 17-18 (Utah 1983); see also Capital General Corp. v. Utah Dept. of 
11 
Bus. Reg., Ill P.2d 494,496 (Utah App. 1989) ("[I]t is appropriate to broadly construe the 
provisions of the [Utah's securities] Act to effectuate the legislative intention behind it."); 
accord State v. Brewer, 932 S.W.2d 1,10 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1996); Caldwell v. State, 
95 S.W.3d 563, 567 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002). 
B. Relevant statutes. 
Defendant was charged with securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61 -1 -1 (2000). 
Under that statute, "[ijt is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to:" 
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading; or 
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1. "' Sale' or'sell' includes every contract for the sale of, contract to 
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(a) 
(2000). uFor value" is not statutorily defined. See id. § 61-1-13. However, "[t]he issuance 
of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, 
or acquisition of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security . . . , unless the sole 
purpose of the transaction is to change the issuer's domicile." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). 
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C. The circumstances surrounding the August 9th transaction do not 
support defendant's claim that the transaction did not constitute a 
disposition of securities for value. 
Nothing in the circumstances surrounding the August 9th transaction supports 
defendant's contention that the transaction constituted merely a change in the form of Myers' 
and Young's ownership of their farm, not a disposition of their farm for value. 
Description of the Americandairy.com proposal. Neither Schwenke nor defendant 
ever portrayed the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com as 
merely a change in the form of their ownership of the farm. To the contrary, from the 
beginning, defendant and Schwenke presented the transaction as "an investment" 
opportunity in which dairy farms would combine their resources into one corporation and 
thereby spur investment by outsiders. The idea, according to Schwenke," was "to get. . . 
like 10-15,000 cows" and "basically... open a public company[;] he wanted to sell stocks in 
Americandairy.com and . . . that was where he was . . . going to get public financing" 
(R.1999:124,127). According to Schwenke, "he had about $10,000,000 worth of assets . . . 
to put into this, as well as doctors and lawyers" and "other investors" who wanted to invest 
in the corporation (R.1999:132-33,155,165). In fact, "there was another dairy involved in 
Holden and he hoped to get more" (R.1999:134). 
Thus, nothing in defendant's or Schwenke's description of their proposal suggested 
that the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com would merely 
effect a change in the form of their ownership of the farm. Rather, the proposal was all about 
investment opportunities. 
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The Stock Purchase/Trade Agreement. The primary document executed on 
August 9th was the "Stock Purchase/Trade Agreement" (the Agreement). Both the 
Agreement's recitals and its substantive provisions indicate that the purpose of the contract 
was to sell Americandairy.com stock to the victims (St.Exh.l, attached at Addendum B). 
After defining Americandairy.com as Seller and Milk-King Dairy as Purchaser and 
stating that Americandairy.com has "capital stock of 10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par 
value common stock," the recitals state that "the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and 
the Seller desires to sell said stock" and that the Agreement is entered into "in order to 
consummate the purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock." Consistent with these 
recitals, the first substantive provision of the Agreement provides that, "at the closing of the 
transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell . . . to the Purchaser certificates 
representing such stock, and the Purchaser shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's 
Stock in consideration of the purchase price set forth in this Agreement." The second 
provision defines the "amount and payment of purchase price," providing that "[t]he total 
consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in Exhibit 'A' attached 
hereto." Finally, Exhibit A of the Agreement defines "the 'Purchase Price'" the victims 
would pay for the stock in Americandairy.com they would receive (St.Exh.l). 
None of these provisions support defendant's contention that the August 9th 
transaction was not a sale of securities for value. To the contrary, and consistent with 
Schwenke's original proposal, each reflects that the purpose of the Agreement was for the 
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victims to transfer their farm to Americandahy.com and thereby purchase a partial ownership 
interest—as represented by the 200,000 shares of stock—in Americandairy.com. 
Defendant's contention. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues the 
August 9th transaction was not a sale of securities for value. In doing so, defendant focuses 
on evidence that, when the Agreement was signed, Myers and Young were "the only 
shareholders of American Dairy." Aplt. Br. at 27. Thus, defendant asserts, the Agreement 
"operated only to change the form of ownership of the dairy and equipment from the LLC to 
American Dairy, both of which were wholly owned by Myers and Young." Id. at 27-28. 
In support of his claim, defendant cites Capital General Corp. v. Utah Dept .of Bus. 
Reg., Ill P.2d 494 (Utah App. 1989), and Premier Van SchaackRealty, Inc. v. Seig, 2002 
UT App 173, 51 P.3d 24. See Aplt. Br. at 26-28. Neither case supports his claim. 
In Capital General, Capital General Corp. (CGC) was charged with the unlawful 
distribution of stock without registration. CGC had purchased 1,000,000 shares of a 
company for $2000. 777 P.2d at 495. At the time, CGCs shares were the only shares issued 
by the company; moreover, the company "had no actual business function at this time and its 
sole asset was the $2000 CGC had paid for the 1,000,000 shares." Id. CGC then distributed 
a portion of the shares "to approximately 900 of its clients . . . and other contacts," 
supposedly "to create and maintain goodwill" with those people. Id. at 495. It was 
"undisputed that CGC did not receive any monetary or other direct financial consideration 
from those receiving the stock." Id. 
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On appeal, CGC argued that its distribution of the shares did not constitute an "offer 
or sale" of the company's stock, i.e., a "disposition o f . . . a security for value" under the 
Utah Uniform Securities Act. See id. at 496-97. In holding that it did, this Court rejected 
CGC's argument that "the concept 'for value' mandates a direct exchange of economic 
considerations between the transferor and transferee in order for the transaction to qualify as 
an 'offer or sale' under [the Act]." Id. at 497. "[Vjalue," this Court held, is not limited to 
"monetary benefit," but, rather, "can include enhanced abilities to borrow, raise capital, and 
other general benefits associated with publicly held companies." Id. And such "economic 
benefits render the disposition 'for va lue ' . . . , even though those benefits flow[] indirectly 
from the marketplace rather than directly from the transferees." Id. 
Defendant appears to argue that Capital General does not support a finding of "for 
value" in this case because Myers and Young "were at all times the only shareholders of 
American Dairy." Apt. Br. at 27. But defendant fails to explain why Myers' and Young's 
shareholder status rendered the exchange of their farm to Americandairy.com for stock not 
"for value" under Capital General. According to the evidence, Myers and Young were "at 
all times" the sole shareholders in the corporation only because the proposal Schwenke 
presented to them—which envisioned other dairy fanners joining the venture and becoming 
shareholders—never bore fruit. Defendant cites no case law holding that the first people to 
purchase stock in a new venture have not purchased stock "for value" merely because, at that 
point, they are the sole shareholders in the venture. 
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Alternatively, defendant asserts there was no "value" under Capital Generalbecause 
"both the dairy and equipment allegedly given to American Dairy were in fact so 
encumbered as to be valueless." Aplt. Br. at 27. However, to make his case, defendant relies 
on evidence not presented at trial. See id, (citing evidence produced at post-trial restitution 
hearing). Moreover, as Capital General held, "value" is not limited to "monetary benefit" 
flowing "directly from the transferees." Capital General, 111 P.2d at 497. Rather, 
"economic value," including "enhanced abilities to borrow, raise capital, and other general 
benefits" resulting from the corporation's new assets "rendered] the disposition 'for value' 
. . . , even though those benefits flow[] indirectly from the marketplace." Id, 
Finally, according to defendant, the August 9th stock transfer was not "for value" 
even under this latter category because "American Dairy was not a public company and there 
were no other shareholders who stood to profit from the distribution of shares to Myers and 
Young through either cash considerations or the creation of a market." Aplt. Br. at 26-27. 
Before transferring stock to Myers and Young, however, Americandaiiy.com had no assets 
and "engaged in no apparent business operations." Capital General, 111 P.2d at 497. By 
inducing Myers and Young to convey their farm to the company, Americandairy.com now 
had assets to its name, thereby increasing both the marketability of the corporation to other 
dairy farmers as an investment option and the possibility of monetary benefit to the 
corporation's promoters from other investors. 
In sum, Capital General does not support defendant's claim that the stock transfer 
here was not a disposition of securities "for value." 
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Neither does Premier Van Schaack Realty. In that case, Premier Van Schaak Realty 
(Premier) sought to enforce a brokerage fee payment provision in a real estate listing 
agreement involving one of Seig's properties. 2002 UT App 173, % 1. Under the agreement, 
Seig agreed to pay Premier a brokerage fee if, during the listing period, anyone ""locate[d] a 
party who is ready, willing and able to buy, sell or exchange . . . the Property, or any part 
thereof, at the listing price . . . or any other price or terms to which [Seig] may agree . . . . ' " 
Id. at T| 2. During the listing period, Seig formed a limited liability company (LLC) with 
three other individuals, and conveyed his property to the LLC for a 40% interest in the LLC 
and other benefits. Id. at f 4. Upon learning of the transaction, Premier demanded its 
commission under the listing agreement. Id. at % 6. The trial court rejected Premier's claim, 
ruling that the transaction between Seig and the LLC "was not a sale or exchange pursuant to 
the Agreement because it lacked consideration." Id. 
On appeal, Premier argued that Seig's transfer of his property to the LLC was a "sale 
or exchange" under the listing agreement because "Sieg received consideration from [the 
LLC]," including "a 40% interest in [the LLC]." Id. at 110. This Court rejected Premier's 
claim. In so doing, this Court distinguished between the sale of real estate—in which "once 
a person sells property, appreciation, depreciation, or total loss of the property is of no 
concern since the sale severs the seller from any interest in the property"—and the 
conveyance of real estate to a business entity in exchange for an interest in that entity—in 
which the conveyor "undertakes the risks of an investor" and "assumes the risk that the value 
of investment will increase or decrease over time, or that the investment may be completely 
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lost." Id. at Tj 13. According to this Court, because Seig's transfer of his property to the LLC 
required him to assume the risks of an investor, the transfer did not constitute a sale of real 
estate under the listing agreement, and thus, Seig did not have to pay Premier any 
commission on the transfer. Id. 
Defendant argues Premier supports his contention that "Myers' and Young's 
conversion [of their farm] from LLC to American Dairy was not a disposition for value, but 
rather was a change in the form of ownership." Aplt Br. at 26-27. But, as defendant notes, 
Premier did not address the meaning of "for value" in the securities context; rather, it 
"considered whether a 'sale' or 'exchange' of real property occurred to trigger a contractual 
commission provision." Id. at 26. Thus, Premier provides no authoritative insight as to 
what constitutes "disposition of. . . a security for value" under Utah's securities laws. 
Moreover, to the extent Premier speaks to that issue at all, it undermines defendant's 
contention, rather than supports it. The very reason this Court held that no sale of real estate 
occurred in Premier was because Seig's transfer of his property to an LLC was an 
investment of real estate—presumably governed by securities laws—not a sale of real 
estate—governed by contracts law applicable to real estate listing agreements. See Premier 
Van Schaak Realty, 2002 UT App 173, ffij 8-13. 
In sum, neither the facts of this case nor the case law cited by defendant supports his 
contention that the August 9th transaction was not a disposition of securities for value. 
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D. The securities fraud statute does not support defendant's claim 
that the August 9th transaction did not constitute a disposition of 
securities for value. 
Even if the August 9th transaction merely changed the form of Myers' and Young's 
ownership of their farm, it still constituted a disposition of securities for value under Utah 's 
securities laws. 
In asserting that the transaction did not fall within the reach of Section 61-1-1, 
defendant notes that "Section 61-1-1 limits its application to conduct occuning 'in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security.'" Aplt. Br. at 25 (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1). Defendant also notes that "'sale'" is defined to "'include[] every 
contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for 
value'" and "'offer'" is defined to "'include[] every attempt or offer to dispose of, or 
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value'" Id. (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(a), (b)) (emphasis in original).3 
Defendant ignores section 61-l-13(22)(c), which gives "examples of the definitions 
[of 'sale' and 'offer'] in Subsections 22(a) and (b)." Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(c) 
(2000). Specifically, defendant ignores section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii), which expressly 
provides that "the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of 
3
 Although defendant's citation is actually to Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(v)(i), see 
Aplt. Br. at 25-26, that statutory reference appears to be a typographical error, since section 
61-1-13(1) defines "affiliate" and has no subsection (v)(i). 
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the security issued . . . , unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change the issuer's 
domicile." Id. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). 
Under the plain language of section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii), even securities transactions 
that merely change the fonn of ownership of one's assets from an LLC to a coiporation fall 
within the reach of section 61-1-1, "unless the sole purpose of the transaction is to change 
the issuer's domicile." Id. In this case, nothing in the evidence suggested that the August 
9th transaction occurred solely "to change the issuer's domicile. Id. Thus, under section 61-
1-13 (22)(c)(vii), the August 9th transaction fell within the reach of section 61-1-1, even if it 
merely changed the form of Myers' and Young's ownership of their farm. 
Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
LETTING THE STATE'S EXPERT OPINE ON THE GENERAL 
REACH OF UTAH'S SECURITIES LAWS AND THE 
DISCLOSURES NECESSARY THEREUNDER, WHERE THE 
STATE'S EXPERT NEVER OFFERED AN OPINION ON 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State's 
securities expert to offer legal conclusions concerning what constitutes a violation of the 
securities fraud statute under which defendant was charged. See Aplt. Br. at 28-42. 
According to defendant, the expert's testimony "should have been excluded . . . because it 
was riddled with impermissible legal conclusions" and "incorrect interpretation^]" of the 
law. Id. at 29,31. And, defendant contends, admitting the expert's testimony, "coupled with 
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the trial court's refusal to provide [defendant's] curative instruction, greatly and unduly 
prejudiced [him]." Id. at 42. Defendant's claim fails. 
A. Governing law. 
At the time of defendant's trial, rule 702 provided that, "[i]f scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702.4 Rule 704 provides that "testimony in the 
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704(a). 
Under these rules, expert "opinions that 'tell the jury what result to reach' or 'give 
legal conclusions' [are] impermissible." State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ^ f 15, 155 P.3d 
909. Ssuch testimony '"tend[s] to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, 
jury, and witness.'" Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, "there is 'a danger that a juror may 
turn to the [witness's legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the applicable 
law.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
Notwithstanding this limitation, a trial court "'has wide discretion in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony.'" State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,607 (Utah App. 1998) 
(citation omitted). And "[n]o 'bright line' separates permissible ultimate issue testimony 
under rule 704 and impermissible 'overbroad legal responses' a witness may give during 
questioning." Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 16. 
4
 Rule 702 was amended effective November 1, 2007, but the amendments do not 
apply here and therefore do not affect the analysis in this case. 
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Thus, "expert testimony may be appropriate in 'securities fraud cases because the 
technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject 
within the common experience and would help the jury understand the issues before them.'" 
State v. Larsen {Larsen II), 865 P.2d 1355,1361-62 (Utah 1993)) (holding trial court didnot 
abuse discretion by allowing expert to testify as to materiality of omitted information in 
securities fraud case, even though "materiality" was "ultimate issue" jury had to decide). 
Such testimony may include the meaning or reach of legal terms if it "aid[s] the jury in 
resolving the factual disputes" at hand. Id. at 1361 n.l 1. Indeed, such testimony may be 
particularly helpful "where the subject matter is not one of common observation or 
knowledge, or in other words, where witnesses because of particular knowledge are 
competent to reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove 
incapable of forming a correct judgment without skilled assistance." Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 
UT 31, Tf 22, 977 P.2d 1193 (upholding admission of expert testimony as to what caused 
injury in negligence case); cf. United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 
2005) (testimony that embraces ultimate issue of guilty "is permissible as long as the 
expert's testimony assists, rather than supplants, the jury's judgment"); United States v. 
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285,1294 (2d Cir. 1991) (no error in allowing expert testimony giving 
"general background on federal securities regulation and the filing requirements [under a 
government] Schedule"). 
Consequently, a "semantic characterization of [an expert's] testimony as a legal 
conclusion does not, without more, move the testimony outside the scope of [rule 704, the] 
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ultimate-issue rule." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1363. Rather, the deciding factor in detemiining 
whether expert testimony transgresses the pennissible line in Utah appears to be whether the 
expert expressly opines that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. 
In Larsen II, therefore, the supreme court found no error in the trial court letting an 
expert opine "that some of the material Larson had omitted from the securities documents 
could have been important or significant to an investor," where the expert "did not, as Larsen 
suggests, testify that Larsen was guilty, nor did [the expert] testify that, as a matter of law, 
the facts satisfied the legal standard of materiality." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n. 10. 
Similarly, in State v. Hany, 873 P.2d 1149, 1154-55 & n.9 (Utah App. 1994), this Court 
upheld the admission of "expert testimony concerning the materiality of certain 
misrepresentations and omissions Harry allegedly made or failed to make." The Hany court 
also held that the expert's testimony "that selling away is illegal" was not improper where 
the "expert did not testify that Harry actually sold away from [his firm]," but instead, "[t]hat 
factual determination was left to the jury." Id., 873 P.2d at 1154 n.9. 
Conversely, in State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah App. 1996) (citation 
omitted), this Court found error because the expert's testimony "clearly state[d] legal 
conclusions [regarding guilt] because the witnesses tie[d] their opinions to the requirements 
of Utah law." See also Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ^  14-22 (in illegal possession of firearms 
case, expert's opinion regarding what constitutes "possession" under charging statute and 
concluding that Davis's conduct constituted "possession" under the statute was 
impermissible because expert "'applied the facts of the case to the prohibition[s] in the 
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statute, resulting] in the rendering of a legal conclusion [that Davis had committed the crime 
alleged].'") (citations omitted). 
Finally, even if an expert's testimony does include impermissible legal conclusions, 
defendant must still show that the expert's testimony was prejudicial. See Larsen II, 865 
P.2d at 1363. Such testimony is not prejudicial where it "matche[s] the [law] set forth in the 
jury instruction^]." State v. LaCount, 732 N.W.2d 29,35-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (no error 
in allowing expert testimony where expert's "description of investment contracts matched 
the definition set forth in the jury instruction"), affd, 750 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008), cert, 
denied, 129 S.Ct. 631(2008); see also People v. Prendergast, 87 P.3d 175, 183 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2003); People v. Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (App. Div. 1998). Nor is it prejudicial 
where the trial court "correctly admonishe[s] the jury as to the relative roles of expert 
testimony and opinion evidence," "instructs] the jury to accord no unusual deference to an 
expert's opinions," and gives "careful instructions regarding the legal definition[s] and 
requirements of the term[s] . . . as used in the [governing] statute." Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 
1363; see also Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63. 
B. Proceedings below. 
Before opening statements, the trial court twice instructed the jury that the court "will 
instruct you on the law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict" 
(R.1999:7,10). 
Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, was 
then called as the State's securities expert (R. 1999:38-39). The State began by asking Hines 
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to identify the purposes of securities regulation. After the trial court overruled defendant's 
relevance objection, Hines answered that the two main purpose of securities law were "to 
protect investors" and "to guard against fraud." Hines explained that "in the area of 
securities . . . , it is a seller beware market... . In other words, the seller has to make sure 
that they disclose all material facts to the person that's purchasing that, that [security]." 
When defendant objected to Hines's characterization as a "misstatement of law," the trial 
court stated, "I've qualified him as an expert. That's his opinion. You can cross-examine 
him on that" (R.1999:49-52). 
Hines then explained that securities laws are "trigger[ed]" when "a person is either 
directly or indirectly in connection with the offer or sale of a security" (R. 1999:52). And 
Hines stated that "[tjhere are two ways that we normally see that the security statute can be 
violated": "misrepresentation of material facts or the omission of material fact in light of 
circumstances under which a statement is made not misleading. That's one. And the second 
is basically a course of conduct that will operate as a fraud against others" (R.1999:53). 
Hines next opined as to some of the "important facts that would have to be disclosed 
in all circumstances" in connection with the sale of securities. Hines testified "the general 
test is is it an important fact that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to know before 
they make their decision." Such facts would "certainly" include "financial statements of the 
entity . . . , the history of any of the control people[,] whether they have been civilly sued, 
whether they've had administrative actions, bankruptcies and things like that." Other 
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important facts include "[competition in the market, conflicts] of interest," and "risk 
factors" involving the security (R. 1999:55-56). 
When defendant objected that "61-1-1 does not require that you disclose all of these 
things, it just says if you make a disclosure it has to be accurate," the State responded, "[i]t 
also speaks to [] omissions." The trial court overruled defendant's objection. Hines then 
identified "important risk factors" that should be disclosed, including "the business success 
of the control persons of the company,... how capitalized or how much money they have to 
work with . . . , how many people are you selling this to and how many people have a piece 
of this for their money." Hines noted that "all of the disclosure" also "goes to" half-truths, 
where "[t]he statute says that you have to disclose all material facts in light of circumstances 
under which a statement is made, not misleading." After the court overruled defendant's 
objection that Hines' testimony "[mjisstates the law," Hines clarified that the half-truth issue 
"is only triggered by some predicate statement that's made" (R. 1999:56-58). 
When Hines explained that the duty to disclose applied to people both directly and 
indirectly offering securities, defendant asked that Hines' response be stricken because "that 
. . . goes to the jury instructions." Instead, the court instructed the jury "that at some point in 
this trial the court is going to give you instructions with respect to a, issues of law that you, 
that will govern your deliberations" (R.1999:61). 
When asked whether there were "any other important significant factors" that should 
be disclosed, Hines responded, "I don't think it's possible to specifically list all the 
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circumstances that would need to be disclosed. Again, the test is does a reasonable prudent 
investor, is that a fact that they would want to know" (R. 1999:62). 
On cross-examination, defendant asked Hines to discuss the elements of the securities 
fraud statute. In connection with his questions, defendant used "a chart that is large" that had 
"the statute on it" (R. 1999:65-66). Defendant then led Hines through the statute, questioning 
Hines as to how he analyzed transactions to determine whether a violation of the statute had 
occurred. In particular, defendant questioned Hines concerning how he analyzed 
transactions under the "misleading" part of the statute, oftentimes posing hypothetical to 
Hines to elicit when an omitted statement did and did not render a prior statement misleading 
(R. 1999:68-83). Partially through Hines' cross-examination, the prosecutor noted that 
defendant had been asking "for a long time" about legal conclusions despite defendant's 
prior objections to such conclusions earlier in the trial (R.1999:81). 
After then briefly questioning Hines on the statutory definition of "sale," especially 
that portion requiring disposition of a security "for value," defendant returned to the 
securities fraud statute, questioned Hines on the requirement that disclosures or omissions be 
"material," and confirmed that "material" is "what a reasonable investor would think was 
important" (R. 1999:84-89). Defendant again questioned Hines concerning the steps he took 
to analyze a transaction under section 61-1-1 (R.1999:90-92,105-08). 
Defendant confirmed with Hines that had any of the elements of the statute not been 
met, Hines "wouldn't feel too good about prosecuting" (R. 1999:93-94). Defendant then 
asked if "it [was] fair to say that you've rarely testified that somebody wasn't guilty once 
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you got on the stand" and whether "there [had] ever been a time . . . when you testified that 
any criminal defendant in any case you've been involved in was not guilty?" The court 
sustained the prosecutor's objections, noting that Hines "would never instruct the jury to find 
a person guilty or not guilty. That would be an improper use of an expert witness" 
(R. 1999:96). Defendant then asked Hines whether, "if you determine that any of these 
elements [of section 61-1-1] are not, are not met would you recommend... that this case be 
dismissed." Hines replied, "I have done that before" (R. 1999:98). 
Over the State's objection, defendant then repeatedly questioned Hines on what 
disclosures he, as president ofAmericandairy.com, was required to make under section 61-1-
1. When Hines set out what he believed was the test, defendant objected. The court 
overruled the objection, stating, "Well, you asked the question. He answered it" 
(R. 1999:104). 
On re-direct, the State asked Hines again to address whether the "financial exposure 
of officers" was required under section 61-1-1. Hines responded, "It is my opinion that 
financial disclosure or the financial background and their business background of officers of 
a, of a company that you're buying stock in is important because I think the prudent investor 
would want to know how successful they had been at previous business ventures before they 
buy stock in that company. Also if they're subjected to any lawsuits,... it may affect their 
ability for the new company to survive" (R. 1999:114). 
In his case-in-chief, defendant called Nathan Whitney Dredge, a published corporate 
and securities attorney, as his securities expert (R. 1999:372,375,380). Dredge testified that 
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although he agreed with "much o f Hines's testimony, "I departed on some points." Dredge 
explained that "I depart" when it comes to "what one considers in terms of materiality and, 
and that's where I go to the supreme court language that it is a totality of the circumstances, 
it is the economic reality of the transaction" that "affect[s] the definition of a security, 
definition of offer and sale and a, what is material and what is not material" (R. 1999:395-
97). 
Then, defendant, as he had done with Hines, walked Dredge through the language of 
the securities fraud statute. In the process, Dredge opined that no security was involved in 
this case because "this transaction is simply a change in the form of business ownership for 
Mr. Young and Myers" and, therefore, did not involve a security based on "what was the 
intent of [securities] statutes and.. . what the [SJupreme [Cjourthas said" (R. 1999:398,401). 
Thus, although "[technically it is an offer and sale and technically it is a security," it was not 
a security under the securities fraud statute "[b]ecause it's not the type of transaction that the 
. . . legislatures want to govern" (R.1999:402-03). 
Dredge further testified that, although he had sometimes acted as "the initial officer or 
director [of a corporation] for a day" in order to complete a corporate securities transaction, 
he did not have to "give a whole bunch of disclosures" when he did so (R. 1999:401,403). 
According to Dredge, although an officer may have an affirmative duty to disclose "a bunch 
of stuff "[in] some occasions," that duty does not exist "in all occasions" (R. 1999:418). 
In further explaining why the transaction was not the type covered by section 61-1-1, 
Dredge again referenced the Supreme Court's "economic reality" test. Dredge repeated that 
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because Myers and Young merely changed the form of ownership of their farm and did not 
relinquish control of their farm, no securities transaction took place (R. 1999:406-07). In this 
context, Dredge opined, defendant's introduction to Myers and Young as an "attorney" or 
"president" of the corporation was not material, nor was whether defendant "had some sort 
of expertise," "had worked on Wall Street," or had an "ongoing [bar] disciplinary action" 
(R.1999:424-26). 
On cross-examination, Dredge testified that defendant's disclosures to Myers and 
Young were "adequate" (R. 1999:455). The State then asked Dredge whether he was familiar 
with a Supreme Court case not yet referenced by him concerning the definition of stock. 
Although Dredge did not "recall the facts of the case," he was "familiar with . . . language 
used by the [Sjupreme [CJourt" that when "an instrument is labeled stock it possesses all of 
the traditional characteristics, a court is not required to look at the economic substance of the 
transaction." When defendant objected to the State's representation of the holding in the 
case, the court overruled defendant's objection (R. 1999:456-58). 
On re-direct, defendant and Dredge clarified the meaning of the Supreme Court case 
the State had cited (R. 1999:470,473). Under any definition provided by the Supreme Court, 
Dredge concluded, the transaction here did not involve the sale or purchase of a security as 
contemplated by the securities fraud statute (R. 1999:473-74). 
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
You are to be governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced 
in this trial and the law as stated to you by me. 
(R. 1428; Instr. 1) (emphasis added). 
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A person who, by education, study, and experience has become an 
expert... may give his or her opinion as to any such matter in which he or she 
is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert 
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, 
however, by such an opinion. 
If an expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict 
with these instructions, you are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness. 
(R. 1436; Instr. 8) (emphasis added). 
In addition, Instruction 15 set out the elements of the crime with which defendant had 
been charged, and Instruction 17 set out definitions of material tenns included within those 
elements (R. 1444, 1446; Instr. 15, 17). 
C. Expert testimony that does not specifically comment on the facts of the 
case but only addresses what types of transactions are generally 
covered by securities laws and what general requirements those laws 
impose does not constitute impermissible testimony. 
Defendant attacks Hines's testimony on three grounds. First, he asserts Hines's 
testimony "was riddled with impermissible legal conclusions" and "opinion[s] on the 
governing law." Aplt. Br. at 29. Second, defendant argues "[t]he impennissibility of Mr. 
Hines' testimony is magnified by the incorrect interpretation he gave to the law in question." 
Id. at 31. Finally, defendant contends that Hines' testimony was prejudicial. See id. at 39. 
1. Inadmissible legal conclusions. 
Defendant's fundamental contention is that Hines's testimony contained legal 
conclusions concerning Utah securities law and "[a]n expert witness is not allowed to 
provide purely legal conclusions." Aplt. Br. at 28 (holding and capitalization omitted). 
However, as stated, expert testimony "may be appropriate in 'securities fraud cases 
because the technical nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average 
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layman.'" Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (citation omitted). Moreover, expert testimony 
may include legal conclusions "' where the subject matter is not one of common observation 
or knowledge, or . . . where witnesses because of particular knowledge are competent to 
reach an intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons are likely to prove incapable of 
forming a correct judgment without skilled assistance." Patey, 1999 UT 31, \ 22; see also 
LarsenII, 865 P.2d at 1361 & n.l 1;Dazey, 403 F.3dat 1171-72;Bilzerian, 926 F.2dat 1294. 
In this case, Hines's direct testimony included no impermissible legal conclusions 
under this standard. As defendant notes, Hines did testify on the purposes of securities laws 
and the disclosures generally required under them. See Aplt. Br. at 29-30. However, at no 
time during direct examination was Hines asked whether defendant's conduct in this case 
met those disclosure requirements and at no time did Hines sua sponte offer an opinion on 
that question. &eR.1999:38-61. 
Consequently, nothing in Hines's testimony on direct examination was impermissible. 
See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1361-62 (rejecting claim that expert's testimony "as to the 
'materiality' of information Larsen allegedly had omitted from securities-related documents" 
constituted improper "'legal conclusion' that Larsen's omissions violated [the securities 
fraud statute]" where "materiality, as it relates to the importance of the omitted information, 
was an 'ultimate issue'" upon which expert testimony may be admitted); see also 
Prendergast, 87 P.3d at 183; LaCount, 732 N.W.2d at 35-36; Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1171-72; 
Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1294. 
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2. Incorrect legal conclusions. 
Alternatively, defendant challenges Hines's testimony as containing two assertions of 
law that are inconsistent with the plain language of section 61-1-1 (2). See Aplt. Br. at 31-37. 
As stated, section 61-1-1(2) prohibits any person, in connection with the sale or offer of 
securities, to "[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). 
a. General disclosures required under section 61-1-1(2). 
Defendant claims that Hines "insistently]" testified that, under section 61 -1 -1 (2), "the 
important facts that would have to be disclosed in all circumstances are numerous. But the 
general test is is it an important fact that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to 
know before they make their decision.'" Aplt. Br. at 32, 34 (citing R. 1999:55-57). 
According to defendant, Hines misstates the law because section 61 -1 -1 (2) "is not a general 
disclosure statute requiring individuals involved in a securities transaction to disclose 
everything a reasonable investor might want to know," but rather "requires only that if a 
statement is made, it is unlawful to omit a material fact necessary to make that [] statement 
not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the predicate statement is made. " Id. 
But when first asked how the securities fraud statute could be violated, Hines testified 
that one way was when there "is the misrepresentation of material facts or the omission of 
material fact in light of circumstances under which a statement is made not misleading" 
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(R. 1999:53) (emphasis added). Thus, at the very beginning of his testimony, Hines 
accurately described the law defendant claims he misrepresented. 
Moreover, when Hines testified that the general test as to whether a fact is 
"important" is whether it is a fact "that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to know 
before they make their decision," defendant objected that "61-1-1 does not require that you 
disclose all of these things." Hines countered that the statute "says that you have to disclose 
all material facts in light of circumstances under which a statement is made, not misleading." 
In other words, Hines explained, "[i]f there's a rest of the story to be told you need to tell 
that so an investor can make [an] intelligent decision. That is only triggered by some 
predicate statement that's made though" (R. 1999:58) (emphasis added). Thus, "[y]ou take 
the total mix of all facts and what should have been important under those set of 
circumstances" (R. 1999:58-59). Again, therefore, Hines acknowledged that the extent to 
which material disclosures are necessaiy depends on what prior statements were made. 
Finally, on cross-examination, defendant revisited Hines's testimony concerning "an 
omission and.. . a half-truth" (R. 1999:67). Hines reiterated that, for the omissions provision 
to apply, "[tjhere has to be some as I call it a predicate statement," "[y]ou have to say 
something to trigger it" (R. 1999:69). And, when defendant walked Hines through the 
analysis the jury would have to conduct in determining whether section 61-1-1(2) was 
violated, Hines again confirmed that, under the omissions part of the statute, the "question is 
is there an important fact that was not told that the ordinary prudent investor would have 
wanted to know to make that statement not misleading"; "[t]he omission of a material fact 
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has to be in light of circumstances under which a statement is made by anyone that if left 
alone is misleading" (R. 1999:73-74). In other words, Hines agreed, "this statute... doesn't 
say youVe got to disclose a whole bunch of stuff, it just says if you disclose something it 
dang well better be true" (R.199:79-80). 
In sum, Hines's testimony on both direct examination and cross was consistent both 
with the plain language of section 61-1-1(2) and defendant's own interpretation of that 
section. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2); Aplt. Br. at 32-34. Consequently, defendant's 
claim that Hines's testimony misstates the law under section 61-1-1(2) fails. 
b. Specific disclosures required of "controlled persons." 
Defendant also challenges Hines's contention that section 61-1-1(2) imposes greater 
disclosure requirements on "officers, presidents or other so-called 'control persons'" than it 
does on other people. Aplt. Br. at 34. According to defendant, this testimony misstates the 
law because "there is no greater or lesser duty of disclosure upon an officer than there is 
upon any other seller or purchaser of securities under the statute." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Hines's testimony, however, is supported by the law. In Securities and Exchange 
Comm yn v. Merchant Capital LLC, 483 F.3d 747,750 (11th Cir. 2007), two people—Wyer 
and Beasley—formed Merchant "to participate in the business of buying, collecting, and 
reselling charged-off consumer debt from financial institutions." Neither individual had 
experience in that industry. Id. at 751. Wyer, whose "most recent business was conducting 
direct marketing for financial institutions," "had declared personal bankruptcy because that 
business defaulted on certain obligations that he had personally guaranteed." Id. To raise 
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money for their new venture, Wyer and Beasley sold interests in limited liability paitnersliips 
over which Merchant served as managing general partner. Id. at 752-53. However, in 
selling those securities, Wyer failed to disclose his prior personal bankruptcy. Id. at 770. 
The appellate court held that, "under the facts in the record, a reasonable investor would have 
been interested in Wyer's previous personal banlcruptcy, and that it was thus materially 
misleading to omit the information," where "Wyer... put his experience in issue by touting, 
in great detail, Wyer's business experience." Id. at 770. 
In Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 
2001), defendants sought investors from Suez Equity in a venture in which a man named 
Mallick was the venture's "founder, principal executive, and controlling shareholder." 
However, in promoting the investments, defendants provided Suez-Equity with a modified 
report on the venture's principals, which "omitted negative events in Mallick's business and 
financial history," including "three tax liens against Mallick personally" and "several civil 
lawsuits that had been decided against Mallick." Id. On appeal, the court held that those 
"misrepresentations . . . led plaintiffs to appraise the value of [the venture's] securities 
incorrectly by assuming the competency of Mallick, the [venture's] principal." Id. at 96. 
Both of these courts' holdings are consistent with the plain language of section 61-1-
1(2). As stated, that section prohibits any person, in connection with the sale or offer of 
securities, to "[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading." Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2). A person's position as 
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CEO and president of the venture involved constitutes one "of the circumstances under 
which [statements] are made." Id. Under the plain language of section 61-1-1 (2), therefore, 
that circumstance necessarily affects what disclosures must be made regarding that person to 
ensure that "statements made [by or about him] are not misleading." Id. 
Consequently, defendant's claim that Hines's testimony misstates the law concerning 
officers and other control persons also fails. 
D. Defendant's challenge to Hines's testimony also fails because he was 
not prejudiced by that testimony. 
Defendant's challenge to Hines's testimony also fails for lack of prejudice. 
According to defendant, "the prejudice caused by [Hines's] testimony was great" because 
Hines was the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, and "[c]ertainly 
the jury would give special attention to the Director's opinion as to what the law requires and 
what conduct violates the law, even if it's the wrong one." Aplt. Br. at 39. "This is 
particularly true," defendant contends, "where the trial court failed to correct the errors" and 
"the State did not focus either its presentation or summation of evidence on predicate 
statements rendered misleading by an omission." Id. 
As discussed, however, defendant has not shown that Hines's testimony concerning 
Utah securities law was either improper or inaccurate. A defendant is not prejudiced by an 
expert's testimony if the expert "accurately stated the law." Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63; see 
also Pendergast, 87 P.3d at 183. 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the State did address the predicate 
statements on which defendant's charge was based. In his opening statement, the prosecutor 
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described the case against defendant as one in which "important information... was shoved 
off to the side, and was painted in a light which didn't give the true and complete picture of 
what really is going on here" (R. 1999:17). Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor 
identified at least two material statements on which defendant's charge was based: that 
defendant was "a stock expert" and that defendant stated the stock "is going to $4 to $8." 
The prosecutor then added that defendant "makes all kinds of materiality facts," but "I'm not 
going to insult your, your intelligence. You have heard the evidence here" (R. 1999:527-28). 
"So yes, you bet ya, you've got statements of material fact." And, the prosecutor continued, 
"[o]missions, omissions. You've got evidence, verbal evidence, testimonial evidence" 
(R. 1999:529-30). Thus, contrary to defendant's contention, the State did "focus . . . its 
presentation [and] summation of the evidence on predicate statements rendered misleading 
by an omission." Aplt. Br. at 39. 
Third, to the extent defendant disagreed with Hines's opinions concerning the law, 
defendant was able to and did present his own expert—a securities attorney—to challenge 
Hines's opinions. Given Dredge's qualifications as an expert—both having extensive 
experience in securities practice and being published in the area (R.1999:375,380)—it is 
unlikely that "the jury would [have] give[n] special attention to [Hines's] opinion as to what 
the law requires and what conduct violates the law, even if it's the wrong one." Aplt. Br. at 
39. 
Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did properly instruct the 
jury on the law and the weight to be given expert testimony on the law. Both before trial 
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began and before jury deliberations, the court instructed the jury that "[y]ou are to be 
governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as 
stated to you by me" (R.1999:7,10;R.1428;Instr.l). In addition, during Hines's testimony, 
the court noted that Hines's testimony was only "his opinion" (R. 1999:52). And, at the close 
of evidence, the court instructed the jury that it was "not bound... by [expert] opinion" and 
"[i]f an expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict with these 
instructions, you are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness" (R.1436; Instr.8). The 
court also instructed the jury as to the elements of the crime the State had to prove and the 
statutory definitions of terms included within those elements (R. 1443-44,1446; Instr. 15,17). 
See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1363 (finding no prejudice where trial court "correctly 
admonishe[s] the jury as to the relative roles of expert testimony and opinion evidence," 
"instructs] the jury to accord no unusual deference to an expert's opinions," and gives 
"careful instructions regarding the legal defmition[s] and requirements of the term[s]. . . as 
used in the [governing] statute"); Lurie, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 63.5 
In sum, none of defendant's claims of prejudice withstand scrutiny. 
<u *j^ *i* *i' ji* 
5
 In his brief, defendant claims the trial court erred "by refusing . . . to offer [his] 
proposed curative jury instruction that affirmative disclosure of material facts is not 
required." Aplt. Br. at 37. Defendant's one-paragraph discussion of this issue, however, is 
inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (brief "shall contain... citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, ^ f 20, 
63 P.3d 72 (appellate court "is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research") (citations omitted). This Court may also reject 
defendant's claim because the proposed instruction was, on its face, confusing. See R. 1663. 
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Because defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
Hines's testimony, defendant's challenge to that testimony fails. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS AND SEPARATION OF 
POWERS CLAIMS FAIL, WHERE THEY REST ON AN 
INACCURATE PORTRAYAL OF THE STATE'S LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY AND WHERE THE TRIAL 
COURT, IN ANY CASE, PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE LAW 
Defendant claims that "Utah Code Section 61-1-1 is unconstitutional as applied to 
[him] in this case because it is both unconstitutionally vague and contrary to the separations 
of powers clause." Aplt. Br. at 42. Defendant's vagueness claim rests on his contention that 
"the State both before and throughout trial applied an incorrect theory and interpretation of 
Section 61 -1 -1 (2) that informed the jury they could convict [him] for failure to affinnatively 
disclose all facts." Id. at 43. Similarly, defendant's separation of powers claim rests on 
"[t]he State's and [its expert's] attempts to interpret Section 61-1-1(2) as ageneral disclosure 
statute" Id. at 45. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Even assuming arguendo the State mischaracterized the law in this case, that alone 
cannot support defendant's due process and separation of powers claims. Under well-
established law, "'[misstatements of the law do not prejudice a defendant where the error 
has been satisfactorily corrected.'" State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925,930 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37,44 (Utah 1996), and other cases). And the error has 
been satisfactorily corrected if "the trial court provide[s] the jury with a complete instmction 
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on the law and direct[s] the jurors to follow the law as stated by the court." Id. (citing State 
v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 555 (Utah App. 1993)). 
Thus, to succeed on his due process and separation of powers claims, defendant must 
show at a minimum both that the prosecutor misstated the law and that the trial court's jury 
instructions failed to correct it. Defendant cannot make that showing in this case. 
First, as discussed, the State did not misrepresent the elements of securities fraud 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). See pp. 32-38 supra. 
Second, even if the State had misrepresented that law, the jury instructions were 
adequate to correct it. The jury was twice instructed that the court "will instruct you on the 
law that you must follow and apply in deciding your verdict" (R.1999:7;R.1999:10). In 
addition, after one of defendant's objections during Mr. Hines's testimony, the trial court 
reiterated that "the court is going to indicate to the jury that at some point in this trial the 
court is going to give you instructions with respect to a, issues of law that you, that will 
govern your deliberations. And a, at that time a, the court will instruct you as to what the 
law is" (R. 1999:61). Then, in its written instructions, the court reiterated that the jury was 
"to be governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the 
law as stated to you by me" (R.1428;Instr.l). The jury was also instructed that "[i]f an 
expert has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict with these instructions, you 
are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness" (R.1436;Instr.8). In addition, it was 
instructed that to find defendant guilty, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, "[i]n 
connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security" to Myers and Young, defendant 
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[djirectly or indirectly made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or 
engaged in an act, practice or course of business which operated or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon [Myers and/or Young]. 
(R. 1443 Jury Instr.15). The jury was also instructed that a "material fact" is "something 
which a buyer of ordinaiy intelligence and prudence would think to be of importance in 
determining whether to buy or sell a security" and that "fraud" is "any untme statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading" 
(R.1446-47:JuryInstr.l7). 
Defendant does not acknowledge these instructions, let alone demonstrate that they 
failed to correct any alleged misstatement of the law by the State. See Aplt. Br. at 42-44. In 
fact, the sole instruction with which defendant takes issue is Jury Instruction 18. See id. at 
44-45. Jury Instruction 18 provided: 
One of the allegations against the Defendant in the Charge addressed in Count 
1, is that the Defendant, either directly or indirectly, made an untrue statement 
of material fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading. 
Under this theory, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the individual 
investor believed the statements to be true, nor that he relied upon the 
statements in his decision making process, so long as the statements were 
made such that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have relied 
upon the statements in making an investment decision. 
(R. 1448 Jury Instr.18). According to defendant, this instruction supports his vagueness 
claim because it "invites the jury to ignore Young's testimony [that he did not rely on 
43 
defendant's statements in buying the Americandairy.com stock] and instead substitute its 
own judgment of what information is important." Aplt. Br. at 45. 
Defendant does not cite a single legal authority supporting his contention that this 
instruction "is not constitutional." Id, In fact, Jury Instruction 18*s mandate that the jury 
determine materiality based on an objective reasonable person standard is consistent with 
Utah law. See Larsen II, 865 P.2d at 1362 (defining "factually material" in securities fraud 
context as "likely to influence a reasonable investor") (emphasis added); S &F Supply Co. 
v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah 1974) (defining "material fact" as "something which a 
buyer or seller ofordinaiy intelligence and prudence would think to be of some importance 
in detennining whether to buy or sell") (emphasis added). 
In sum, defendant has not shown either that the State misrepresented the law 
applicable to his case or that the trial court's jury instructions were insufficient to correct any 
such error. Defendant's constitutional challenges to the law as applied, therefore, fail. 
IV. 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH DEFENDANT'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS 
RENEWED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WHERE DEFENDANT'S 
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his "Motion for 
New Trial and Renewed Motion [for New Trial] on the grounds that, inter alia, [defendant] 
failed to establish the grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence." Aplt. 
Br. at 48. In asserting his claim, defendant relies only on the "newly discovered evidence" 
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produced in his Renewed Motion for New Trial. Because defendant failed to file a timely 
notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying his Renewed Motion for New Trial, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim. 
A. Applicable law. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction over any trial court orders from which no proper notice 
of appeal has been filed. See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Ser\\ of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48, lj 5,2 
P.3d 447 ("Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives [appellate] court[s] of 
jurisdiction over the appeal"). 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides when notices of appeal must be 
filed from final judgments. Rule 4(a) provides, "In a case in which an appeal is permitted as 
a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal... shall be 
filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Rule 4(c) then provides that "[a] notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision Judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order 
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof." Utah R. App. P. 4(c). 
Rule 4(b), however, provides an exception to rules 4(a) and 4(c) when a timely 
motion for new trial has been filed: 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the 
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the 
order disposing of the motion: 
(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
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(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but 
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be 
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such 
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment 
To appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a 
party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order. 
Finally, "[a] motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry of 
the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before expiration of the time 
for filing a motion for new trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). 
B. Proceedings below. 
Defendant's jury trial ended on March 7,2007 (R. 1999:478). His sentencing hearing 
was held on June 6, 2007 (R. 1612-14). On June 15, 2007, defendant objected to the 
restitution order and requested a restitution hearing (R. 1619-20). On June 20, 2007, 
defendant filed a timely Motion for New Trial (R. 1621-23,1624-70). On July 2, 2007, the 
trial court entered its final judgment on defendant's conviction (R. 1677-80). 
In his Motion for New Trial, defendant included a newly discovered evidence claim 
(R. 1952-53). Defendant listed the newly discovered evidence as (1) discovery of a 
"previously unknown witness . . . familiar with the Milk King Dairy operation" with "direct 
information concerning the viability of the dairy operation..., which directly impacted the 
dairy's viability and value prior to its limited involvement with [defendant]"; (2) discovery 
of a "Trustee's Deed " which "discloses a competitive bid auction at the foreclosure by 
Central Bank which established a fair market value for the dairy of $161,000.00, while the 
dairy had debts exceeding $324,000.00 at the time of foreclosure—within months of the 
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dairy's limited involvement with [defendant]"; and (3) discovery of "a Federal Tax Lien for 
approximately $13,000 [that] was recorded against the dairy within months of Johnson's 
limited involvement with Mr. Young and Mr. Myers" (R. 1652-53). The trial court rejected 
defendant's newly discovered evidence claim, however, in part because "[ajside from 
defendant's representations in his memoranda, he presented] no evidence or affidavits 
relating to the evidence he purports to have discovered" (R.1977). 
After denying defendant's Motion for New Trial on October 10,2007, the court held 
restitution hearings on October 10 and October 24,2007 (R. 1964-79,1980-82,1995-96). On 
November 8, 2007, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 2000-02). On November 
14, 2007, defendant filed an untimely Renewed Motion for New Trial "based upon new 
evidence produced by the State at the Restitution Hearings" (R.2003-05,2006-12). On 
December 5,2007, the trial court entered a Restitution Order (R.2032-42). On February 11, 
2008, the trial court heard argument on defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial and 
denied the motion (R.2074). An order attached to defendant's brief suggests the court 
entered a final order denying defendant's motion on August 12,2008. See Aplt. Br. at Add. 
G. No copy of that order, however, appears in the record on appeal. In any event, defendant 
did not file a new notice of appeal after the trial court entered its order. 
C. Because defendant's claim goes only to record evidence raised in his 
Renewed Motion for New Trial and because defendant did not file a 
timely notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of that motion, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's claim. 
In asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions for new 
trial, defendant relies on "evidence provided by the State for and during the Restitution 
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Hearings." Aplt. Br. at 47. That evidence, however, was never produced in support of 
defendant's original Motion for New Trial. See R.1977 (trial court denying defendant's 
newly discovered evidence claim raised in Motion for New Trial because "[a]side from 
defendant's representations in his memoranda, he presented] no evidence or affidavits 
relating to the evidence he purports to have discovered). Rather, it was produced only during 
defendant's restitution hearings, which occurred after the trial court had already denied 
defendant's Motion for New Trial (R.1964-79,1980-82,1995-96). Thus, to rely on that 
evidence to challenge the denial of his request for new trial, defendant must be challenging 
the trial court's denial of his Renewed Motion for New Trial, not his Motion for New Trial. 
Defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial, however, was not filed until four months 
after the trial court entered its final judgment in this case (R. 1677-80,2003-2012). Thus, his 
motion was untimely under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
24 (requiring motion for new trial be filed no later than ten days after final judgment). 
More importantly, even assuming defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial was 
timely, the only notice of appeal filed in this case was filed on November 8, 2007, six days 
before defendant filed his Renewed Motion for New Trial (R.2000-02). Defendant's notice 
of appeal, therefore, could not perfect an appeal from the trial court's order denying that 
motion. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) (requiring notice of appeal from denial of new trial motion 
be filed within 30 days after final order denying motion). 
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This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to reach defendant's challenge to that order. 
See Reisbeck, 2000 UT 48, % 5.6 
V. 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REACH 
DEFENDANT'S RESTITUTION CLAIM WHERE DEFENDANT'S 
NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT PERFECT AN APPEAL FROM 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RESTITUTION ORDER 
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court's final order requiring him to pay 
$ 120,000 in restitution, entered after two restitution hearings held October 10 and 24,2007. 
See Aplt. Br. at 51-55. Defendant's notice of appeal, however, was untimely as to the trial 
court's final restitution order. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction to reach his claim. 
A. Governing law. 
In most cases, where restitution is determined at sentencing, rule 4(a), of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, will govern when a notice of appeal from a final judgment of 
6
 Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, it fails. First, defendant presents no 
explanation as to why public UCC records were not discoverable before trial. See Aplt. Br. 
at 46-51. Nor does he explain why, knowing that Myers and Young had a loan with Central 
Bank on the farm property, defendant did not question Myers or Young on the amount of 
that loan at trial. See id. Second, the whole premise of defendant's claim is that the value of 
the property at issue is its "fair market value." See id. at 50. Defendant concedes that "fair 
market value" is "'what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer 
would pay to the true owner for the [property].'" Id. (quoting State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 
284 (Utah App. 1996)). As the trial court ruled when rejecting defendant's claim in his first 
Motion for New Trial, that definition of "fair market value" "does not require the subtraction 
of related debts, liens, or other encumbrances on the property" (R. 1973). Indeed, it seems a 
truism that the fair market value of a $400,000 home does not decrease merely because the 
current owner has a mortgage on it. Consequently, evidence that Myers and Young 
transferred the real property on which their farm was located and farm equipment having a 
purchase or replacement value exceeding $130,000, to Americandairy.com was sufficient to 
find that the transfer involved at least $10,000 worth of property. 
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conviction will be sufficient to appeal the restitution order. However, where a final 
judgment of conviction in a criminal case is entered before final detemiination of restitution, 
a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment does not necessarily constitute a 
timely notice of appeal from the order determining restitution. See State v. Gamer, 2005 UT 
6, 106P.3d729. 
In Garner, Gamer entered a Seiy plea but failed to file a timely notice of appeal from 
the trial court's original final judgment. See id. at f^ 2. Instead, Gamer filed notices of 
appeal from an amended judgment emphasizing the conditional nature of Gamer's plea and 
then from a second amended order "setting the amount of restitution." Id. at fflf 2-4. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding that a "modification 
detemiining the amount of restitution" does not "create[] a new final judgment and beg[i]n a 
new time period for appeals." Id. at ^ j 14-16. In reaching that conclusion, the supreme court 
distinguished a civil case in which it had held that '"orders made on attorney fees subsequent 
t o . . . judgment were modifications or amendments in a "material matter'"" that restarted the 
time for filing a notice of appeal. Id. atf 14 (quoting ProMax Development Corp. v. Raille, 
2000 UT 4 4 11, 998 P.2d 254). In ProMax, the court noted, "we held that, 'in the interest 
of judicial economy,' attorney fees must be determined before the judgment becomes final 
for purposes of an appeal, and that such a holding 'will "enabl[e] an appellant to appeal all 
issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal.'"" Id. at ^ 16 
(quoting ProMax, 2000 UT 4, f 14 (citation omitted)). However, "civil cases and criminal 
cases implicate principles of judicial economy in different ways." Id. And, in criminal 
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cases, u[aj criminal defendant... would frequently be disadvantaged by staying the time for 
filing an appeal until an exact amount for restitution could be determined." Id. 
Consequently, "where orders of restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the 
subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment for puiposes of 
appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction." Id. at f 17. 
The clear implication of Garner's conclusion that a defendant may not be able "to 
appeal all issues . . . in a single notice of appeal," Garner, 2005 UT 6, ^  16, is that, just as a 
timely notice from a post-judgment restitution order may not be timely to perfect an appeal 
from the underlying judgment, see id. at f^lj 14-16, a timely notice of appeal from the 
underlying judgment may not be timely to perfect an appeal from a post-judgment restitution 
order. Rather, to appeal from a post-judgment restitution order, a defendant must file a 
timely notice of appeal as to that order. Cf. State v. Abbot, 2000 UT App 342U at *1 (per 
curiam) (noting that timely appeal from restitution order does not constitute timely appeal 
from underlying judgment, stating that defendant "appeals from the restitution order entered 
in this case" and that defendant "did not file a timely appeal from the conviction and 
sentence, and [therefore] no further issues are properly before this court"); Salt Lake City v. 
Guffey, 2001 UT App 17U at 1 (per curiam) (holding defendant's notice of appeal, filed 
more than 30 days after final judgment but within 30 days of post-judgment order denying 
motion to arrest judgment, "was untimely as to her conviction because it was not filed within 
30 days of the entry of the conviction"). And, to be timely as to that order, the notice of 
appeal must be filed "within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from," 
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Utah R. App. P. 4(a), or "after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order [in the 
restitution proceeding] but before entry of the judgment or order," Utah R. App. P. 4(c); City 
o/St. George v. Smith, &14P.2d 1154,1155-56 (UtahApp. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that 
"decision" in rule 4(c) "is broadly defined to cover final judgments, interlocutory orders, or 
'the first step leading to a judgment'" in proceeding from which appeal is taken) (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 366 (5th ed. 1979)). 
B. Proceedings below. 
On June 6, 2007, as part of sentencing, defendant was ordered to pay restitution, 
jointly and severally with Paul Schwenke, in the amount of $ 125,000 (R. 1612-14). On June 
15, 2007, defendant filed an objection to the restitution order and requested a restitution 
hearing (R. 1619-20). On July 2, 2007, the trial court entered its final Sentence, Judgment, 
and Commitment (R. 1700-22). On October 10, 2007, the trial court entered an order 
denying defendant's first Motion for New Trial (R. 1964-67). On October 10 and 24, 2007, 
the trial court held restitution hearings (R. 1995-96). At the close of those hearings, the trial 
court did not announce a restitution amount but, rather, "[took] the matter under advisement" 
(R.2075 (2d) at 132). On November 8,2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R.2000-02). 
On December 5, 2007, the trial court reduced restitution to $120,000 (R.2032-42). 
C. Analysis. 
Defendant's notice of appeal, filed after the trial court denied his first motion for new 
trial but before the trial court announced its decision concerning restitution, did not perfect 
an appeal from the trial court's restitution order. First, the notice of appeal was not filed 
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"within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
Thus, the notice of appeal was not timely under rule 4(a). See id. Second, the notice of 
appeal was filed before the trial court announced any "decision, judgment, or order" in the 
post-judgment restitution proceeding. Utah R. App. P. 4(c). Thus, the notice of appeal was 
also untimely under rule 4(c). See id.; see also State v. R.C., 2005 UT App 105U at *1 
(memorandum decision) (per curiam) (holding rule 4(c) did not save juvenile's appeal 
following entry of two no-contest pleas where notice of appeal was filed before final 
judgment and u[t]he record does not reflect that the . . . court announced a 'decision, 
judgment or order,' regarding the judgment and sentence prior to entry of the same"); Smith, 
813 P.2d at 1155-56. 
This Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenge to the 
court's restitution order. See Reisbeckv. HCA Health Serv. of Utah, Inc., 2000 UT 48,1J 5,2 
P.3d 447 ("Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives [appellate] court[s] of 
jurisdiction over the appeal.").7 
7
 Even if this Court were to reach defendant's claim, it would fail. First, because 
Schwenke's acts were foreseeable given the nature of the August 9th transaction, defendant 
can be held liable for Schwenke's conduct concerning the farm after August 9th. See, e.g., 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338-39 (Utah 1980) (holding that, if defendant, "by his 
wrongful conduct creates a condition of peril, his action can properly be found to be the 
proximate cause of a resulting injury, even though later events which combined to cause the 
injury may also be classified as negligent, so long as the later act is something which can 
reasonably be expected to follow in the natural sequence of events"); see also State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1215 (Utah 1993) (holding that "sufficient intervening cause" to relieve one 
from liability for criminal conduct must be both "'unforeseeable and one in which [the] 
accused does not participate,'" a cause "'so extraordinary that it is unfair to hold [the] 
accused responsible'") (citation omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm both defendant's conviction and 
the trial court's restitution order. 
Respectfully submitted March *S, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
fjhJlM. $, /clug^ki^ 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
Second, although the trial court may have erred in directly equating Myers' and 
Young's losses to the $50,000 loan taken out against the farm by Schwenke and the $70,000 
certificate of deposit Myers lost when the farm went under, the evidence at the restitution 
hearing was sufficient to support the trial court's $120,000 restitution order. In particular, 
Myers testified that he lost about $58,000 from the CD when the bank foreclosed on the loan 
for which it was collateral and spent the other $12,000 paying off farm bills 
((R.2075(l):165)). In addition, Myers testified, he and Young lost another "$70,000 or so" 
in feed costs for feeding Schwenke's cows, which $70,000 Young testified came from their 
cash reserve (R. 2075(1):203;R.2075(2):26,28). 
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R U L E 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions, 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the 
time for all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the 
order disposing of the motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or 
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, 
under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but 
before entry of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be 
treated as filed after entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such 
a notice of appeal is effective to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To 
appeal from a final order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party 
must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of appeal within the 
prescribed time measured from"the entry of the order. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after 
the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the 
judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of-appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusa-
ble neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice 
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time 
or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever 
occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. 
Upon a showing that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, 
the trial court shall reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A 
defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentenc-
ing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not represented 
and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 
days after service of the motion to file a written response. ' If the prosecutor 
opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may 
present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to 
appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's 
notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined 
in an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice of 
appeal. 
R U L E 2 4 . MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry 
of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before 
expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
in evidence or in argument. 
R U L E 7 0 2 . TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
R U L E 7 0 4 . OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an 
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition 
of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as J:o 
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
61-1-13. Definitions, 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or indirectly, through one or 
more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common 
control with a person specified. 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect 
purchases or sales of securities. "Agent" does not include an individual 
who represents: 
(a) an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration, 
directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or 
sales of securities in this state, and who: 
(i) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection 
61-l-14(l)(a), (b), (c), (i), or (j); 
(ii) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2); 
(iii) effects transactions in a covered security as described in 
Sections 18(b)(3) and 18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act .of 1933; or 
(iv) effects transactions with existing employees, partners, 
officers, or directors of the issuer; or 
(b) a broker-dealer in effecting transactions in this state limited to 
those transactions described in Section 15(h)(2) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer 
or issuer, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, is an agent only if he otherwise comes within this defini-
tion. 
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own 
account. "Broker-dealer" does not include: 
(a) an agent; 
(b) an issuer; 
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; 
(d) a person who has no place of business in this state if: 
(i) the person effects transactions in this state exclusively with 
or through: 
(A) the issuers of the securities involved in the transac-
tions; 
(B) other broker-dealers; or 
(C) banks, savings institutions, trust companies, insur-
ance companies, investment companies as defined in the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing 
trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers, 
whether acting for themselves or as trustees; or 
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person does 
not direct more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in any 
manner to persons other than those specified in Subsection 
(3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or any of the offerees is then 
present in this state; 
(e) a general partner who organizes and effects transactions in 
securities of three or fewer limited partnerships, of which the person 
is the general partner, in any period of 12 consecutive months; 
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is 
confined to those transactions made by or through a broker-dealer 
licensed in this state; 
(g) a person who is a real estate broker licensed in this state and 
who effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness 
secured by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an 
agreement for the sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire 
mortgage, deed or trust, or agreement, together with all the bonds or 
other evidences of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered and sold as 
a unit; 
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or com-
modity options; or 
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate, 
consistent with the public interest and protection of investors, as not 
within the intent of this subsection. 
(4) "Buy" or "purchase" means every contract for purchase of, contract 
to buy, or acquisition of a security or interest in a security for value. 
(5) "Commodity" means, except as otherwise specified by the division by 
rule: 
(a) any agricultural, grain, or livestock product or byproduct, 
except real property or any timber, agricultural, or livestock product 
grown or raised on real property and offered or sold bj^ the owner or 
lessee of the real property; 
(b) any metal or mineral, including a precious metal, except a 
numismatic coin whose fair market value is at least 15% greater than 
the value of the metal it contains; 
(c) any gem or gemstone, whether characterized as precious, semi-
precious, or otherwise; 
(d) any fuel, wrhether liquid, gaseous, or otherwise; 
(e) any foreign currency; and 
(f) all other goods, articles, products, or items of any kind, except 
any work of art offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction or 
offered or sold through a private sale by the owner of the work. 
(6) "Commodity contract" means any account, agreement, or contract 
for the purchase or sale, primarily for speculation or investment purposes 
and not for use or consumption by the offeree or purchaser, of one or more 
commodities, whether for immediate or subsequent delivery or whether 
delivery is intended by the parties, and whether characterized as a cash 
contract, deferred shipment or deferred delivery contract, forward con-
tract, futures contract, installment or margin contract, leverage contract, 
or otherwise. 
(a) Any commodity contract offered or sold shall, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be offered or sold for 
speculation or investment purposes. 
(b) (i) A commodity contract shall not include any contract or 
agreement which requires, and under which the purchaser re-
ceives, within 28 calendar days from the payment in good funds 
any portion of the purchase price, physical delivery of the total 
amount of each commodity to be purchased under the contract or 
agreement. 
(ii) The purchaser is not considered to have received physical 
delivery of the total amount of each commodity to be purchased 
under the contract or agreement when the commodity or com-
modities are held as collateral for a loan or are subject to a lien of 
any person when the loan or lien arises in connection with the 
purchase of each commodity or commodities. 
(7) (a) "Commodity option" means any account, agreement, or contract 
giving a party to the option the right but not the obligation to 
purchase or sell one or more commodities or one or more commodity 
contracts, or both whether characterized as an option, privilege, 
indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance guaranty, decline guaranty, or 
otherwise. 
(b) It does not include an option traded on a national securities 
exchange registered with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission or on a board of trade designated as a contract market by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Securities charged 
with the administration and enforcement of this chapter. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Securities established by Section 
61-1-18. 
(10) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 
(11) "Federal covered adviser" means a person who is registered under 
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or is excluded from the 
definition of "investment adviser" under Section 202(a)(ll) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940. 
(12) "Federal covered security" means any security that is a covered 
security under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 or rules or 
regulations promulgated thereunder. 
(13) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not limited to their common-
law meanings. 
(14) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to payment of principal or 
interest as to debt securities, or dividends as to equity securities. 
(15) (a) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the 
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, 
for compensation and as a part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. 
(b) "Investment adviser" also includes financial planners and other 
persons who, as an integral component of other financially related 
services, provide the foregoing investment advisory services to others 
for compensation and as part of a business or who hold themselves out 
as providing the foregoing investment advisory services to others for 
compensation. 
(c) "Investment adviser" does not include: 
(i) an investment adviser representative; 
(ii) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; 
(iii) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose perfor-
mance of these services is solely incidental to the practice of his 
profession; 
(iv) a broker-dealer or its agent whose performance of these 
services is solely incidental to the conduct of its business as a 
broker-dealer and who receives no special compensation for them; 
(v) a publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news column, news 
letter, news magazine, or business or financial publication or 
service, of general, regular, and paid circulation, whether com-
municated in hard copy form, or by electronic means, or other-
wise, that does not consist of the rendering of advice on the basis 
of the specific investment situation of each client; 
(vi) any person who is a federal covered adviser; or 
(vii) such other persons not within the intent of Subsection (15) 
as the division may by rule or order designate. 
(16) "Investment adviser representative" means any partner, officer, 
director of, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, or other individual, except clerical or ministerial personnel, 
who: 
(a) (i) is employed by or associated with an investment adviser who 
is licensed or required to be licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) has a place of business located in this state and is employed 
by or associated with a federal covered adviser; and 
(b) does any of the following: 
(i) makes any recommendations or otherwise renders advice 
regarding securities; 
(ii) manages accounts or portfolios of clients; 
(iii) determines which recommendation or advice regarding 
securities should be given; 
(iv) solicits, offers, or negotiates for the sale of or sells invest-
ment advisory services; or 
(v) supervises employees who perform any of the foregoing. 
(17) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security or has outstanding a security that it has issued. 
(b) With respect to a preorganization certificate or subscription, 
"issuer" means the promoter or the promoters of the person to be 
organized. 
(c) With respect to: 
(i) interests in trusts, including but not limited to collateral 
trust certificates, voting trust certificates, and certificates of 
deposit for securities; or 
(ii) shares in an investment company without a board of 
directors, "issuer" means the person or persons performing the 
acts and assuming duties of a depositor or manager under the 
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under 
which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional 
sales contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer" 
means the person by whom the equipment or property is to be used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited, 
"issuer" means the partnership itself and not the general partner or 
partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil, gas, 
or mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under the 
titles or leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or right 
of production, whether whole or fractional, who creates fractional 
interests therein for the purpose of sale. 
(18) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the 
issuer. 
(19) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a 
limited liability company, an association, a joint-stock company, a joint 
venture, a trust where the interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by 
a security, an unincorporated organization, a government, or a political 
subdivision of a government. 
(20) "Precious metal" means the following, whether in coin, bullion, or 
other form: 
(a) silver; 
(b) gold; 
(c) platinum; 
(d) palladium; 
(e) copper; and 
(f) such other substances as the division may specify by rule. 
(21) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert with 
one or more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the 
business or enterprise of a person. 
(22) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract to 
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. 
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to dispose 
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security 
for value. 
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in Subsections 
(22)(a) and (b): 
(i) any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on 
account of any purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of 
the subject of the purchase, and has been offered and sold for 
value; 
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is 
each assessment levied on the stock; 
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or 
entitles its holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of 
the same or another issuer is an offer or sale of that security, and 
also an offer of the other security, whether the right to convert or 
acquire is exercisable immediately or in the future; 
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one security for another 
shall constitute an offer or sale of the security received in a 
conversion or exchange, and the offer to buy or the purchase of the 
security converted or exchanged; 
(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person 
receiving the dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative 
right, to receive a cash or property dividend is an offer or sale; 
(vi) a dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or sale; 
or 
(vii) the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, 
reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of 
assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as 
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any security surren-
dered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose of the 
transaction is to change the issuer's domicile. 
(d) The terms defined in Subsections (22)(a) and (b) do not include: 
(i) a good faith gift; 
(ii) a transfer by death; 
(iii) a transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial 
interest in a trust; 
(iv) a security dividend not within Subsection (22)(c)(v) or (vi); 
(v) a securities split or reverse split; or 
(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in 
which a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstand-
ing securities, claims, or property interests, or partly in such 
exchange and partly for cash. 
(23) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act of 
1940" mean the federal statutes of those names as amended before or after 
the effective date of this chapter. 
(24) (a) "Security" means any: 
(i) note; 
(ii) stock; 
(iii) treasury stock; 
(iv) bond; 
(v) debenture; 
(vi) evidence of indebtedness; 
(vii) certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement; 
(viii) collateral-trust certificate; 
(ix) preorganization certificate or subscription; 
(x) transferable share; 
(xi) investment contract; 
(xii) burial certificate or burial contract; 
(xiii) voting-trust certificate; 
(xiv) certificate of deposit for a security; 
(xv) certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or 
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such 
a title or lease; 
(xvi) commodity contract or commodity option; 
(xvii) interest in a limited liability company; or 
(xviii) in general, any interest or instrument commonly known 
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing. 
(b) "Security" does not include any: 
(i) insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under 
which an insurance company promises to pay money in a lump 
sum or periodically for life or some other specified period; or 
(ii) interest in a limited liability company in which the limited 
liability company is formed as part of an estate plan where all of 
the members are related by blood or marriage, there are five or 
fewer members, or the person claiming this exception can prove 
that all of the members are actively engaged in the management 
of the limited liability company. Evidence that members vote or 
have the right to vote, or the right to information concerning the 
business and affairs of the limited liability company, or the right 
to participate in management, shall not establish, without more, 
that all members are actively engaged in the management of the 
limited liability company. 
(25) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
(26) "Working days" means 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
exclusive of legal holidays listed in Section 63-13-2. 
(27) A term not defined in Section 61-1-13 shall have the meaning as 
established by division rule. The meaning of a term neither defined in this 
section nor by rule of the division shall be the meaning commonly accepted 
in the business community. 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
61-1-21. Penalties for violations, 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who willfully 
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was 
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth $10,000 or less; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was 
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth more than $10,000. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he 
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
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SEP 2 2 2BB& STOCK PURCHASE/TRADE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into tnis / day cf August, 
2000, by and between Amsrican-dairy.com, Inc. ("Seller"), and Milk-King Dairy, 
L.C. ("Purchaser")-
WHEREAS, the Seller is the record owner and holder of the issue d and 
outstanding shares of the capita! stockofAmerican-dairy.com, inc. 
("Corporation"), a Utah corporation, which Corporation has issued capital stock of 
10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par value common stock; and 
WHEREAS, the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and the Seller 
desires to sell said stock, upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinafter 
set forth; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained in this Agreement, and in order to consummate the 
purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock aforementioned, it is hereby 
agreed as follows: 
1. PURCHASE AND SALE: 
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, at the closing of 
the transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell, convey, transfer, and 
deliver to the Purchaser certificates representing such stock, and the Purchaser 
shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's Stock in consideration of the 
purchase price set forth in this Agreement. The certificates representing the 
Corporation's Stock shall be duly endorsed for transfer or accompanied by 
appropriate stock transfer powers duly executed in blank Jp-ejther case with 
signatures guaranteed in the customary fashion. The closing of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement ("Closing"), shall be held at 220 South 200 East, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on August 3, 2000, at 1:00 p.m., or such 
other place, date and time as the parties hereto may otherwise agree. 
2. AMOUNT AIM D PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PKiCE. 
The total consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. 
Seller hereby warrants and represents: <o
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(a) Organization and Standing. Corporation is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
Utah and has the corporate power and authority to carry on its business as it is no 
being conducted. 
(b) Restrictions on Stock. 
I. The Seller is not a party to any agreement, written or oral, creating 
rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third person or relating to the 
voting of the Corporation's Stock. 
II. Seller is the lawfu! owner of the Stock, free and ciear of ail 
security interests, liens, encumbrances, equities and other charges. 
III. There are no existing warrants, options, stock purchase 
agreements, redemption agreements, restrictions or any nature, calls or rights to 
subscribe of any character relating to the stock, nor are there any securities 
convertible into such stock. 
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND 
PURCHASER. 
Seiier and Purchaser hereby represent and warrant that there has been no 
act or omission by Seller, Purchaser or the Corporation which would give rise to 
any vaiid claim against any of the parties hereto for a brokerage commission, 
finder's fee, or other like payment in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby. 
5. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
(a) Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the exhibits hereto and 
any written amendments hereof executed by the parties) constitutes the entire 
Agreement and supersedes all prior agreements and understandings, oral and 
written, between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
(b) Sections and Other Headings. The section and other headings 
contained in this Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect 
the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.' 
(c) Governing Lav/. This agreement, and all transactions contemplated 
hereby, shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the Staie of Utah. The parties herein waive thai by jury and agree to 
submit to the personal jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. In the event that litigation 
results from cr arises out of this Agreement or the performance ihereol, the 
parties agree to reimburse the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees, court 
costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the court as costs, in 
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled. 
6. OPTION TO PURCHASER. 
Purchaser shall have the option to sell the stock that it purchased under 
this Agreement back to Seller for the following consideration: 
(a) Reconveyance by deed of all the real properties iisted on Exhibit A that 
had been conveyed under this Agreement, subject to debt not to exceed the 
balance of the debt that was existing at the time of this Agreement less 
reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments from the time of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Reconveyance by bil! of sale of all the personal properties and 
equipment iisted on Exhibit A that had been conveyed under this Agreement, 
subject to debt not to exceed the balance of the debt that was existing at the time 
of this Agreement less reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments 
from the time of this Agreement. 
(c) Improvements since this Agreement. 
Purchaser, upon the exercise of the option herein, agrees to reimburse 
Seller for the w i^ua of improy^r^.oiaio the dairy operations from the time of this 
Agreement to the date of the exercise of Purchaser's option. 
I. Cows: Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for all costs and expenses 
in connection with the purchase of cows purchased by American-dairy.com from 
the time of this Agreement. _ If the cows are financed, the parties shall take all 
necessary steps, if permitted by the financing institution to qualify Purchaser to 
assume the indebtedness on the cows. 
II. Equipment including computer and internet: Purchaser shall 
reimburse Seller for the cost of all equipments installed or purchased by Seller 
since the time of this Agreement. 
The parties acknowledge that pursuant to the exercise of this option to 
repurchase, that Purchaser desires, if possible, to acquire and/or continue to 
operate its dairy business with the cows and equipment acquired by Seiier. 
However, the Purchaser cannot be compelled to assume any financing or pay 
ccsts if Purchaser is unable, if the financing on the cows and equipment cannot 
be assured, the Seller and Purchaser agree to work together insofar as possible, 
to let Purchasers opera:e with the existing financing on them. The aforesaid is 
subject to rights of any financial institution having a lien on or an interest in the 
cows and equipment. 
The Purchaser has the right to exercise this option if, after a reasonable 
time and in no event more than two years from the time of this Agreement, 
American-dairy.com, Inc. has not registered its stock for a public offering. 
7. DIRECTORSHIP. 
Purchaser shall have the right to appoint one member of the Board of 
Directors. Such member will be in addition to the presently constituted board of 
directors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of 
the individual parties hereto on the date first above written. 
AME. DA1RY.COM, INC. MILK-KING DAIRY, LC. 
si L 
By: L / ^ w 4 v { A v' 
J^MES L. YOU 
Managing Me 
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EXHisrrA' 
AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRiCE 
(a) Consideration. 
As total consideration for the purchase and sale of the Corporation's Stock, 
pursuant to this Agreement, the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars (3200,000), in trade for ina equivalent sum 
representing equity in Miik-King Dairy, L.C., properties and equipment. Such total 
consideration to be referred to in this Agreement as the "Purchase Price". 
(b) Payment. 
1. The deed to the following real properties shall be duly 
executed and delivered to American-dairy.com at the time of dosing: 
The rsa' nronertv comTislnn the Milk Kino Farms L.C. dairv cognation 
as set forth in the attached Deed and legal description 
2. The bill of sale for the following persona! properties and 
equipment: 
See the Exhibit attached to that Bill of Sale attached hereto. 
The stock shall be issued as follows: 
Ronald R. Myers 150,000 shares 
James L. Young 50,000 shares 
SCHEDULE "A" 
John Deer 7200 Tractor >}j/j 71 ^ 
Schuler 4910 Vertical Mixsr UA sffsy/f 
Double -12 parallel milk parlor and associated equipment, 
including stalls, milking units, milk transfer equipment, it* /J SIA 4 
milk storage and cooling equipment / ^ j / y 
Hsatwatch Electronic Heat Detection System 11, -7 tfsti 
Scoopmobile LD-7 Loader u 7 <*fwi 
Allis Chalmers 7030 Tractor - ' 
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